Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region, NBER-EASE Volume 8 by Robert W. Crandall
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region,
NBER-EASE Volume 8
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-38674-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_00-1
Conference Date: June 19-21, 1997
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: Telecommunications Liberalization: The U.S. Model
Chapter Author: Robert W. Crandall
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8489
Chapter pages in book: (p. 415 - 436)- 
Telecommunications Liberalization 
The U.S. Model 
Robert W.  Crandall 
The United States has been in the process of liberalizing telecommunica- 
tions for at least thirty years and perhaps more. Private microwave licenses 
were first considered in 1956 and granted in 1959. Competitive entry into 
certain long-distance communications common carriage was first sought 
by  Microwave Communications Incorporated  (now MCI) in  1963; the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approved its entry in 1969. 
Terminal equipment (“customer premises equipment”) was finally liberal- 
ized in  1977. Entry into ordinary, switched long-distance first occurred 
without FCC authorization in 1974, but it was another four years before 
this entry (by MCI) was upheld  by  the courts despite the FCC’s vehe- 
ment protests.’ 
Finally, in 1996, the U.S. Congress passed and the president signed the 
1996 Telecommunications Act, which included, among other provisions, 
a requirement that state regulators permit entry into the delivery of local 
telecommunications  services and-eventually-intrastate  long-distance 
calls.  This  act  also  frees the  Bell  operating  companies to enter  long- 
distance markets under prescribed conditions, allows all local exchange 
companies to enter the video distribution business, and eliminates much 
of the formal rate regulation of cable television. Most of current U.S. tele- 
communications policy attention is quite understandably focused on im- 
plementing this 1996 act, but a thorough understanding of the American 
“model” of liberalization requires an examination and understanding of 
thirty years of trying to open telecommunications markets to competition. 
Robert W.  Crandall is senior fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institution. 
1. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.  FCC, 561 E2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
US.  1040 (1978); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.  FCC, 580 E2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. (1978). 
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Liberalization and deregulation of  trucking and airlines occurred much 
more swiftly in the United States. Why should telecommunications take 
so long? 
14.1  Monopoly, Regulation, and the Distortion of the Rate Structure 
Until recently, telecommunications has generally been thought to be a 
network industry characterized by  economies of scale and density that 
make it a natural monopoly, but this view has rarely been afforded a mar- 
ket test because most nations have provided legal protection of a single, 
national  (and  typically government-owned) carrier.2 The  United  States 
was  an exception because it never had  a government-owned telephone 
system, and it even permitted open entry into telephony in the early part 
of this century. 
Competition soon fell victim to a series of mergers and acquisitions 
and a government regulatory policy that was erected in lieu of  antitrust 
enf~rcement.~  By the 1930s, the industry was essentially a set of regulated 
private monopolies comprising the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (AT&T) and a few smaller, independent operating companies. 
State regulatory commissions had the authority to control intrastate rates 
(local service and intrastate long-distance  calls) of  the local operating 
companies while the FCC exercised loose authority over interstate long 
distance provided solely by AT&T. The implicit premise of this regulation 
was one of franchised monopoly, natural or not, protected from entry as 
long as it served the “public interest.” 
In practice, U.S. regulators-like  those in most countries-protected 
the franchised monopolies from entry while requiring that they price their 
services in response to political forces4 Over time, this meant that long- 
distance rates would be set at levels substantially above cost while local 
connections, particularly for residences, were priced below their long-run 
incremental cost. Equally important, most states required that rates be 
lower in rural and exurban areas than in urban areas despite the obvious 
fact that incremental costs of these connections were higher in less densely 
populated areas5  Finally, residential connection rates were generally far 
2. There are numerous studies of the economies of scale and scope in telecommunications. 
For a useful summary, see Waverman (1989, table 8). 
3. For a review of this history, see Brock  (1981). An alternative view  may be found in 
Temin (1987). 
4.  In most countries, the telephone company has been a public enterprise, often part of 
the postal, telegraph, and telephone authority. These enterprises have generally pursued the 
same practice of keeping local access charges low and long-distance rates artificially high. 
Most developed countries and even many developing countries are now in the process of 
privatizing their telephone companies and establishing independent regulatory  authorities 
like those found in the United States. 
5. Most developed countries have local monthly rates that do  not vary by geographic area. 
However, Canada had rates that were more distorted than those in the United States prior 
to recent regulatory actions. See Crandall and Waverman (1996). Telecommunications Liberalization: The U.S. Model  417 
lower than  monthly  charges to businesses for the same service in  the 
same area. 
These regulatory distortions in the rate structure were not widely under- 
stood in  an era in which no one tried to compete with the established 
telephone monopolists. However, once the FCC began to admit entry into 
interstate services in the 1970s, these distortions became visible and even 
controversial, creating artificial incentives for entrants to attack the over- 
priced interstate service markets. The implicit subsidy from these inter- 
state  services to  local  residential  service that  was  once  accomplished 
largely through internal transfers within AT&T was made explicit in the 
form of “access charges” paid by long-distance carriers to local companies 
for originating and terminating their calls. When AT&T was broken up in 
1984 to settle an antitrust suit brought  by  the federal government, the 
FCC began a protracted policy of reducing the subsidies flowing through 
these access charges. However, the states moved far less aggressively and 
were generally hostile to allowing entry into intrastate markets. As a re- 
sult, even today-nearly  thirty years after telecommunications liberaliza- 
tion began with MCI’s entry into long-distance services-US.  telephone 
rates do not even approximate the long-run incremental cost of services. 
14.2  The Requisites of Successful Liberalization 
The United States essentially stumbled into the liberalization of tele- 
communications in the  1960s and  1970s. There was no carefully drawn 
plan to introduce competition into any market, nor was there legislation 
requiring such liberalization. Rather, the FCC responded to a variety of 
political pressures and direct petitions from those desiring to offer long- 
distance service or competitive terminal equipmenL6 As the distinctions 
between telecommunications  and computer  services began to blur, the 
commission was forced to draw the line between regulated “telecommuni- 
cations” services and unregulated computer-like terminal equipment. 
Competition developed in the long-distance market by a combination 
of FCC rules and a series of  accident^.^ The FCC decided in  1969 and 
again in 197  1 to allow “specialized” carriers to offer dedicated interstate 
service-private  lines-to  business customers. It did not, however, grant 
MCI or subsequent entrants the right to offer ordinary, switched long- 
distance services to any subscriber, business or residential. Nevertheless, 
MCI began to offer switched services in 1974 by terminating its calls over 
Bell company connections designed for other purposes. When the FCC 
6.  See Crandall (1981). “Terminal equipment” or “customer premises equipment” is that 
equipment used by the telephone subscriber to connect to the network. It includes telephone 
handsets, private branch  exchanges (PBXs), modems, fax machines, and answering ma- 
chines. 
7. This history is reviewed in Brock (1981) and, more recently, in Crandall and Waver- 
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attempted to block MCI from offering these services, the federal appellate 
court refused to enforce its order, citing the absence of a procedural record 
that showed that MCI’s service was not in the public interest. When AT&T 
attempted to deny MCI and other entrants use of its local circuits to origi- 
nate and terminate such calls, a variety of antitrust suits were filed, includ- 
ing the  1974 Sherman Act  suit that  would eventually culminate in  the 
breakup of AT&T. 
Obviously, the U.S. government did not have a clear plan to introduce 
competition into telecommunications. Rather, liberalization lurched for- 
ward through a series of uncoordinated regulatory and legal actions. Had 
a liberalization plan been devised, once the government decided that com- 
petition was feasible in a network industry such as telecommunications, it 
should have contained at least the following: 
1. An early end to rate distortions created by  decades of government 
regulation 
2.  Assurances that incumbent  carriers cannot utilize their control of 
“bottleneck” facilities to disadvantage entrants 
3.  Market incentives, but no direct or indirect subsidies, for entrants to 
build new facilities 
4.  A commitment to phase out regulation very soon after entry occurs 
In the United States, trucking, airline, and-on  a more limited basis- 
railroad liberalization satisfied these four conditions. As we shall see, U.S. 
telecommunications liberalization has not and is now proceeding in a di- 
rection that violates at least three of them. 
14.3  Telephone Rate Distortions 
All government regulation is a political process. As a result, political 
considerations  generally  lead  regulators  to  craft  a  variety  of  cross- 
subsidies in the regulated rate structure to benefit various favored constit- 
uent groups. Obviously, such cross-subsidies cannot withstand liberaliza- 
tion because competition drives the above-cost rates toward cost, thereby 
depriving regulators of the sources of funds for such subsidies. The U.S. 
airline regulator, the Civil Aeronautics Board, began to purge the regu- 
lated rate structure of these cross-subsidies almost a decade before deregu- 
lation. In telecommunications, a large share of these cross-subsidies re- 
main, serving as impediments to full liberalization. Despite a substantial 
body of research that demonstrates such cross-subsidies are an inefficient 
and largely ineffective mechanism for inducing subscribers to remain on 
the network,  these subsidies are still defended as necessary to achieve 
“universal service.” 
The magnitude of  cross-subsidy in  U.S.  telecommunications  can be 




Fig. 14.1  Average U.S. business and residential local rates, 1994 
on a flat-rate basis-allowing  callers to make unlimited calls within a local 
area-that  declines with the increase in incremental cost of providing it.8 
Figure 14.1 shows the average residential and business charges arrayed 
by  “loop length,” the distance of  the subscriber from the local s~itch.~ 
Subscribers in less densely populated areas require more copper wire (or 
copper plus fiber) to serve them, yet in the United States rates for both 
businesses and residences decline with the increase in the incremental cost 
of service that is driven by  declining population density. In addition, as 
figure 14.1 shows, businesses typically pay twice as much for the same 
service in any given geographic area despite the fact that the incremental 
cost of business lines is generally somewhat lower than the incremental 
cost of residential lines in the same geographic area.  lo 
The historical (book) cost of providing local connections is less relevant 
to pricing decisions in an industry with some long-lived assets and rapid 
technical change than for others, but these historical accounting costs pro- 
vide at least an indication of the average level of costs that must be recov- 
ered in a regulated industry. In 1995, the local exchange companies that 
submitted their financial results to the FCC reported a total of $51.2 bil- 
lion in noncapital costs for 148.4 million switched lines, or about $345 per 
line. Not all of these costs were dedicated to providing subscriber access, 
8. Flat rates are slowly giving way  to measured rates as carriers begin to petition their 
state regulators for a more rational rate structure in the face of prospective entry. 
9. These data are drawn from NARUC (1994a) and a “benchmark cost” study of local 
network costs funded by several local and long-distance carriers. 
10. These are obvious generalizations about average rates across the lower forty-eight 
states. Businesses are generally closer to the central office, but they generally account for 
more busy-hour minutes of use than do residential subscribers. On balance, before the In- 
ternet complicated life for all telecommunications providers, business and residential rates 
should have been about the same in any given geographic location. 420  Robert W.  Crandall 
Table 14.1  Average Local Telephone Rates in the United States, 1995 
Service  Rate ($) 
Installation charge  38.10 
Monthly residential rate (unlimited calling)  19.54 
Monthly single-line business rate (unlimited callingy  41.77 
Local call ratea  0 
Source: FCC (1997, tables 8.4 and 8.5). 
aA  few states do not permit flat-rate unlimited calling for businesses; the average business 
rate shown here is either the flat rate or the rate that includes 200 five-minute business-day 
calls per month. The zero local call rate is therefore the modal rate, but not the average rate. 
but a large share undoubtedly were.  In addition, these companies had 
about $150 billion in net undepreciated plant in service, or slightly more 
than $1,000 per line. Assuming a 25 percent capital charge for the before- 
tax cost of capital plus depreciation, this suggests an annual capital cost 
of about $250 per year. Thus total accounting costs for the U.S. local 
companies are nearly $600 per year, most of which is required to build 
and maintain local access facilities. By  comparison, the average U.S. resi- 
dential rate was $19.54 and the average single-line business rate for flat- 
rate service was $41.77 in 1995 (see table 14.1)." 
The  second  chart  (fig.  14.2) shows  the  enormous gap  between  the 
charges paid by  long-distance carriers to the local telephone companies 
for connecting their calls and the local companies'  incremental cost of 
originating and terminating these calls.'* Because of this wide gap, both 
for interstate and intrastate calls,13  long-distance rates are artificially high 
and most local residential rates are artificially low. Average long-distance 
rates in the United States remain far above the long-run incremental cost 
of the service, which is likely between 5$ and 76  per minute.14 To  some 
extent, the disparity between interstate rates and costs reflects the failure 
to account  for competitive discount plans.  Even with these discounts, 
however, table 14.2 shows that average transactions prices for all custom- 
11. Several states no longer offer flat-rate service for business customers. Therefore, the 
data in table 14.1 reflect either the flat rate or the rate for a single line generating 200 five- 
minute business-day calls per month. 
12. These data are taken from the FCC's periodic Telephone Trends reports produced by 
the Industry Analysis Division of the Common Carrier Bureau. 
13. Interstate rates are regulated by the FCC; intrastate rates are regulated by  the state 
commissions. The FCC recently acted to reduce interstate (per minute) access charges, but 
this action may well be appealed to the courts, thereby delaying its implementation. 
14. This estimate is the subject of considerable dispute. Robert Crandall and Leonard 
Waverman in an affidavit prepared for Ameritech's application for entry into in-region long- 
distance services in Michigan contend that the long-run incremental cost of long-distance 
service, excluding marketing and administrative costs, is between 1.5$ and 2.5$ per minute, 
including the cost of originating and terminating calls on local company networks. Even if 
marketing and overhead costs are 56 per minute, long-run incremental costs plus average 








Fig. 14.2  Interstate access charges versus incremental cost, 1998 
Table 14.2  Average Discounted Rates for Interstate Long-Distance Service, 
1985-95 
Year  Average Rate ($/minute) 
1985  0.37 
1986  0.30 
1987  0.25 
1988  0.24 
1989  0.22 
1990  0.19 
1991  0.18 
1992  0.17 
1993  0.17 
1994  0.16 
1995  0.15 
Source: Hall (1997). 
ers, business and residential, are still above long-run incremental costs. 
Approximately 56 of this difference is due to the regulatory overpricing of 
local company access charges; the remaining 36 to 5# appears to be rents 
retained by the long-distance carriers or dissipated in nonprice rivalry re- 
flected in marketing expenses. 
There  is  considerable  disagreement  over  the  degree  to  which  long- 
distance rates have fallen in the United States because of  the growth in 
discount pricing plans and the absence of  accurate data on minutes of 
calling. Nevertheless, most data sources provide substantial evidence of 
real rate declines since 1984, driven in large part by the FCC’s reduction 
of access charges from more than 176 per conversation minute in 1984 to 422  Robert W.  Crandall 
66 per minute in 1995 (see table 14.3). The most important issue is whether 
rates continued to decline in the 1990s after the FCC initiated price caps 
and the growth of MCI and Sprint (the third largest carrier) slowed. The 
real list prices for the major carriers have actually risen since 1990 while 
Hall’s MCI data on average revenue per minute show a continuing decline. 
The reduction in long-distance access rates has been effected through 
the phasing-in of a “subscriber line charge” that is now $3.50 per month 
for residences and as much as $6 per month for businesses. Despite this 
new  charge,  however,  real  local  rates-including  the  subscriber  line 
charge-have  not risen in the past decade (figure 14.3). 
There are other sources of cross-subsidies for local telephone rates in 
Table 14.3  Average Long-Distance Rates in the United States (dollars per minute) 
AT&T  AT&T 
Undiscounted  Undiscounted  Bell Company  Bell Company 
Interstate Rate,  Interstate Rate,  IntraLATA Rate,  Intrastate Rate, 
Distance  1997  January 1984  December 199P  December 1983b 
~ 
25 km  0.28  0.26  0.15  0.15 
100 km  0.28  0.32  0.25  0.34 
200 km  0.29  0.41  0.29  0.38 
1  .OOO  km  0.30  0.47  n.a.  n.a. 
Sources: FCC (1997) and NARUC (1996b). 
Nofe;  Table reports rates for five-minute daytime call. n.a. = not applicable. 







Fig. 14.3  Average U.S. real local residential rates, 1985-97 Telecommunications Liberalization: The U.S. Model  423 
the United States: vertical services, high-bandwidth services, and even ad- 
vertising in the Yellow Pages. However, figures 14.1 and 14.2 capture the 
essence of the cross-subsidies in the period before and immediately after 
the passage of the Telecommunications Act of  1996. 
If  liberalization is to proceed, it is  obvious that  these cross-subsidies 
cannot remain. While regulators cannot know carriers’ costs with any pre- 
cision, they should be making their best efforts to unwind these subsidies 
before unleashing the forces of competition. However, these U.S. regula- 
tors had little formal idea of the structure of carriers’ costs until the 1996 
act required that local carriers lease their facilities to new entrants at cost. 
Now, every state commission is involved in lengthy regulatory proceedings 
to determine its local carriers’ costs for setting wholesale rates while failing 
to move retail rates toward these costs. Indeed, the FCC’s first set of rules 
under the  1996 act established guidelines for these cost determinations 
that were extremely controversial and immediately subjected to court ap- 
peal.15  I turn to some of the issues raised in this appeal in the next section, 
but before doing so it is necessary to stress that many U.S. regulators con- 
tinue to try to enforce a politically motivated set of subsidies to rural sub- 
scribers in general, and residential subscribers in particular, from a dis- 
torted retail rate structure while promoting competition. 
14.4  Telephone Penetration and Usage 
Telephone pricing policies in the United States and most other coun- 
tries have been devised with the purported goal of encouraging “universal 
service.” Nevertheless, telephone subscriber penetration (per 100 persons) 
is only marginally greater in the United  States than in most other high- 
income OECD countries (table  14.4). Of all countries,  Sweden has the 
highest  number  of  main  telephone  lines per  100 population,  but  the 
United States and Canada are somewhat above the European average in 
this regard. Canada’s local line rental rates are somewhat below those in the 
United States and its free-calling areas are generally larger, but its average 
per  capita income is somewhat below  the U.S. equivalent.  However, a 
larger percentage of Canadian households have at least one telephone line 
than do U.S. households (Crandall and Waverman 1996, table 1-8). 
Because  the  United  States has  generally  used  flat-rate  charges  for 
monthly line rentals and local calling, particularly for residences, U.S. resi- 
dences and most business establishments face a zero marginal cost for 
local calls. These artificially low local call charges obviously stimulate very 
intensive use of the local network by U.S. telephone subscribers. In table 
15. The U.S. Court of  Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled on this appeal in July  1997, 
deciding against the FCC on virtually every important issue, but the Supreme Court reversed 
the court of appeals in AT&T v.  Iowa Utilities Board in January  1999. 424  Robert W.  Crandall 
Table 14.4  Telephone Lines per 100 Population, 1994 

























Source: International Telecommunication Union (1 996). 
Table 14.5  Telephone Calls per Line in the United States and Other OECD 
Countries, 1994 
Local Calls  National Long-Distance 
Country  per Line  Calls per Line 
Germany  787  559 
Japan  1,165  273 
Netherlands  528  639 
United States  3,250  583 
Sources: Non-U.S. data, International Telecommunication Union  (1  996); U.S. data,  FCC 
(1997). 
14.5 I show average calls per line for the United States and for a few other 
OECD countries for which data are available. Clearly, U.S. telephone sub- 
scribers make far more local calls than do German, Japanese, or Dutch 
subscribers. Moreover, given  extended-area  local  service in  many  US. 
states, many of these calls would be considered long-distance calls in many 
countries. Thus the total number of national long-distance calls in the 
United States is somewhat understated in table 14.5 relative to the num- 
bers in other countries.I6 
Modern  telephone  technology  provides extremely reliable  service as 
long as the telephone plant  is maintained and sufficient switching and 
transmission capacity is provided. In the 1990s, the Bell operating compa- 
nies have averaged less than 1 second of service disruption per access line 
per quarter, or about 3  seconds per line per year (Kraushaar 1996). Al- 
16. These data are at best illustrative given the problems in the data and the differences in 
approaches to collecting them across countries. Telecommunications Liberalization: The US. Model  425 
most all service quality complaints today are related to delays in schedul- 
ing installation or maintenance calls. 
14.5  The Bottleneck 
In any network industry, there may be “essential bottleneck” facilities 
that incumbents control to the temporary or permanent disadvantage of 
new entrants. Transportation carriers may control sections of track, brid- 
ges, or terminal facilities that they refuse to make available to competitors. 
In the United States, such actions may violate the antitrust laws, but rely- 
ing on antitrust enforcement may substantially slow liberalization of here- 
tofore regulated monopoly industries. As a result, regulators must address 
the problems raised by such bottlenecks. 
In telecommunications, bottlenecks  allegedly arise for two rea~0ns.l~ 
First, a subscriber may be connected to the network through a single line 
or interface that is  controlled by  the incumbent carrier. Even if  a new 
carrier replaces the incumbent, this new carrier may now control an essen- 
tial bottleneck  with the same effect on competition in various markets. 
Second, new entrants may require substantial capital and time to duplicate 
certain facilities that incumbents already possess. To provide true network 
service, the entrant has to be able to interconnect its new subscribers with 
all other subscribers. The entrant may be forced to build the facilities re- 
quired to accomplish this interconnection. As a result, the entrant may 
claim that many of these facilities should be offered him by the incumbents 
on reasonable terms-at  least until the entrant can replicate them. The 
crucial policy issues involve defining the scope of these essential facilities 
and the period  of time for which they should be available from the in- 
cumbent. 
14.5.1  Long-Distance Services 
In the United States, AT&T used its control of local bottleneck facilities 
to deny to subscribers connections of quality equivalent to those provided 
to its own (Long Lines) long-distance operations. In part, this occurred 
because AT&T’s local switching capacity-like  that of most monopolists 
of the time-was  built in the 1960s and 1970s under the assumption that 
there would be no long-distance competition. Without modifying these 
switches, AT&T could not offer equal, trunk-side connections to its new 
rival(s). 
After AT&T was divested of its operating companies as the result of an 
antitrust suit brought in 1974 and settled in 1982, the divested “regional 
Bell operating companies” were required to modify their switches to pro- 
17. For an exhaustive analysis of  the potential for bottleneck  abuse, see Bernheim and 
Willig (1996). 426  Robert W.  Crandall 
Table 14.6  Market Shares in the U.S. Long-Distance Market, 1984-95  (percentage 
of revenues) 





























































Source: FCC (1997). 
vide equal access to all long-distance competitors. The other local compa- 
nies were  required to follow shortly thereafter. This conversion to equal 
access took place in the 1984-87  period, and the resulting effect on com- 
petition was dramatic, as table 14.6 shows. AT&T began to lose market 
share much more rapidly after  1984 than in  the previous decade when 
MCI was laboring against an integrated AT&T that did not provide equiv- 
alent access. 
Many observers use the results in table 14.6 to argue that integration 
between the provision of local access and other telecommunications ser- 
vices is necessarily adverse to the development of competition in the latter 
sectors. However, AT&T could have been required to provide equal access 
by  the FCC even without the antitrust divestiture. Indeed, the Canadian 
telephone companies continue to be integrated but are now  required to 
offer equal access to long-distance competitors. As a result, competition 
has developed extremely rapidly in Canada without vertical divestiture- 
indeed even more rapidly than was the experience in the United States. 
The United States went too far in mandating “equal” access, requiring 
local companies to offer connection services to AT&T and its rivals at the 
same rates despite the fact that the local companies’ costs of connecting 
AT&T calls were lower than the costs of connecting the new competitors’ 
calls because AT&T delivered its calls in quantities and at locations that 
were less expensive to connect. This implicit subsidy was deemed to be 
desirable in order to give new entrants a competitive advantage. Similarly, 
in earlier years, when new carriers could not obtain equal-quality connec- 
tions, they were provided enormous discounts that apparently overcom- 
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14.5.2  Local Exchange Access Services 
Until the 1996 Telecommunications Act, most states did not allow com- 
petition for local services except in the form of new “competitive access 
providers” who built fiberoptic rings to serve business customers in large 
cities. Indeed, there were few requests for entry into suburban or rural 
areas, probably because of the distorted retail rate structure. 
The 1996 act now requires that all local companies “unbundle” their 
networks  and offer the  various .components  or “network elements”- 
switching, transport, signaling, the local loop, and so forth-to  any and 
all entrants at rates that reflect some measure of cost. Thus local incum- 
bents must lease any facility, whether a bottleneck or not, to new entrants. 
In  addition,  incumbents must  interconnect  at  any  technically feasible 
point with new entrants. 
These requirements for unbundling and leasing all network elements to 
entrants create enormous controversy over the number of  such elements 
into which the network must be divided and the rates to be charged for 
each. Surely, the only true bottleneck in the local network is the final sub- 
scriber line (local loop) or the interface between the subscriber’s line and 
the rest of the network. To encumber the process of liberalization with the 
requirement of complex new regulations concerning the piecemeal divi- 
sion of incumbent networks preserves regulation more than it fosters liber- 
alization. 
The appropriate policy for interconnecting local networks is less obvi- 
ous. It is possible that incumbents could design an interconnection system 
that makes interconnection with entrants difficult because the latter have 
more modern technology and therefore different interconnection require- 
ments. Reciprocal interconnection  agreements have worked successfully 
for decades for adjacent networks, but few countries have imposed them 
on competing networks in the same geographic area. Some regulation may 
be necessary to assure that incumbents do not frustrate competition, but 
the U.S. 1996 act’s requirement for interconnection at all “feasible” points 
may be excessive. 
On the other hand, any interconnection requirement is likely to be con- 
troversial. If a carrier changes its technology, as it must periodically in the 
face of such rapid technical progress, any rival carrier may complain that 
the changes have the effect of and were even designed to frustrate competi- 
tion if the changes alter interconnection conditions. Given the absence of 
full competition in  local telephone  services anywhere in the world, we 
simply have too little experience to be sure that we  know how to navi- 
gate through these choppy seas. 428  Robert W.  Crandall 
14.6  Encouraging Facilities-Based Entry 
Network industries are often very difficult to enter because of the enor- 
mous scale of investment required. It might be argued that some subsidy 
is required to encourage entrants or to overcome first-mover advantages 
in the provision of terrestrial network or even satellite services. Yet, in the 
United States, four new entrants have built competing national fiberoptic 
networks, and at least one other company is preparing to build another 
one despite the apparent existence of excess transmission capacity. Simi- 
larly, there are several direct broadcast satellite systems in operation in the 
United States and more to come. More to the point, there are at least four 
proposed  low- or medium-orbiting  satellite systems being designed or 
built to offer global wireless communications. Thus there would appear to 
be little grounds for providing subsidies to encourage entry into such ser- 
vices where the markets are very large and the technology is constantly 
improving, thereby reducing the incumbent’s first-mover advantages. 
In smaller countries, competition among terrestrial networks may not 
develop without some direct or indirect subsidies, but even in these coun- 
tries such subsidies are surely questionable. If scale economies are great 
and the markets are small, subsidies may only encourage inefficient entry 
that requires permanent subsidy for survival. While there could be welfare 
gains from  such a perpetual subsidy system, the political  economy of 
maintaining it surely argues for caution. 
The most contentious single issue in implementing the 1996 Telecom- 
munications Act in the United States is the measure of cost to be used in 
setting rates for wholesale unbundled elements. In August 1996, the FCC 
ruled that states should base such rates on “forward-looking’’  estimates of 
long-run incremental costs, where the basis for such costs is the most mod- 
ern technology found anywhere in an incumbent’s network. This require- 
ment to price at TELRIC-“total-element  long-run incremental cost”- 
means that incumbents must offer their networks for lease at rates below 
their own embedded costs because of the rapid technological change in 
telecommunications.’* Unless  the incumbent  has  been  depreciating  its 
plant rapidly to reflect the rate of obsolescence and charging accordingly 
for its services, it will be unable to recover its costs from the new forward- 
looking wholesale rates. The FCC’s ruling was initially overturned by the 
U.S. court of appeals on jurisdictional grounds, but many state regulators 
nevertheless used some form of forward-looking wholesale pricing in their 
implementation of the 1996 act. 
The U.S.  policy of requiring the unbundling of all local network ele- 
ments and pricing them at forward-looking costs rather than historical 
18. This requirement has been dubbed TELRIC-BS (total-element long-run incremental 
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embedded costs has exceedingly unfortunate effects on entry incentives. 
Why should entrants assume the costs and risks of building their  own 
network facilities when they can lease any combination of incumbents’ 
facilities at prices that reflect engineers’ assessments of the lowest costs 
currently available through new construction? The FCC’s ruling may have 
this effect at first-inhibiting  entry through the construction of new facili- 
ties. One and a half years after the passage of the 1996 act, there were few 
major new entrants into local services, but more recently entry has accel- 
erated. 
14.7  Deregulation 
In many countries mere privatization is a step forward in telecommuni- 
cations policy. In others, some liberalization-such  as allowing competi- 
tion in “value-added’’ services-is  a major advance. Ultimately, however, 
liberalization must be accompanied by forbearance or deregulation if the 
benefits of competition are to be realized. 
Perhaps the most important mistake made by the United States in liber- 
alizing its telecommunications sector has been the perpetuation of a bur- 
densome regulatory regime while extolling the virtues of market competi- 
tion. Unlike most other countries, the United States has a divided system 
of regulation that derives from its federalist origins. Intrastate communi- 
cations is regulated by  the states; interstate communications is regulated 
by  the FCC. The Congress could easily alter this regime by  eliminating 
state regulation,  federal  regulation,  or both.  Unfortunately,  the recent 
Telecommunications Act extended  this complex regulatory  system and 
even made it worse by mandating new FCC rules to guide the states, rules 
that have become the centerpiece of lengthy court appeals. 
Both the states and the FCC are responsible for the unfortunate rate 
distortions described above. Both have continued to regulate competitive 
portions of the telecommunications sector far too long. After many years 
of contentious proceedings, the FCC was able to prevail in requiring the 
states to deregulate the sale or lease of terminal equipment-the  handsets, 
PBXs, answering machines, modems, and other equipment with which we 
communicate  over the network.  Subsequently, the FCC waited  eleven 
years after the AT&T divestiture to deregulate AT&T fully. Between 1989 
and  1995, AT&T was regulated by a price-cap regime whose principal 
objective was to prevent AT&T from abusing its market power by reducing 
rates to the disadvantage of rivals. Such regulation is more likely to car- 
telize an industry characterized  by  open entry than to prevent  the re- 
appearance of monopoly. 
Many states still regulate long-distance communications within their 
borders even though the longer calls have been opened to competition for 
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into providing the shorter calls, but only after the regional Bell companies 
are permitted to enter the longer-call market.  l9 
Indeed, most of the arguments for continuing regulation after liberaliza- 
tion come from new entrants who see the regulatory process as a mecha- 
nism for constraining the incumbent and reducing the probability of price 
competition. In  the United  States, the new long-distance carriers  have 
long opposed the decision by the FCC to discontinue formal tariff filings 
that announce price changes in advance. They were successful in court as 
long as AT&T was under rate regulation, but having deregulated AT&T, 
the FCC is now apparently able to deny all carriers the right to file tariffs 
in advance of rate changes. 
The 1996 act should have provided for immediate deregulation of retail 
telephone rates once entry was opened and a set of wholesale prices were 
established for unbundled elements and interconnection. Dozens of stud- 
ies of the effects of regulation in rivalrous industries demonstrate that reg- 
ulation generally prevents prices from adjusting to costs and protects cer- 
tain seller or buyer groups, often through deliberate cross-subsidies. Even 
though the 1996 act mandates the introduction of competition into most 
telecommunications markets that are not now competitive, it also contin- 
ues and even extends the regime of cross-subsidies, instructing the FCC 
to assure that they be explicit and competitively neutral. This mandate 
plus the extensive new  requirements  for regulating wholesale rates and 
interconnection provide far too many opportunities for participants in the 
regulatory process to engage in rent seeking. It also provides for adverse 
incentives. 
For example, the new 1996 act requires that states and the FCC certify 
that local exchange and access markets are reasonably open to competi- 
tion before allowing the regional Bell companies to enter the long-distance 
market. As a result, three of the most likely entrants into local services- 
the largest long-distance companies-have  a perverse incentive to refrain 
from investing in local facilities or from aggressively pursuing local cus- 
tomers so that they can claim that the local Bell companies have failed to 
open their networks sufficiently to allow them to enter. Similarly, the Bell 
companies may be persuaded to delay local competition in their territories 
because the states are not required to open intraLATA (intrastate) long- 
distance services to competition until the Bell companies are granted entry 
19. The details of these market divisions are perhaps too complicated to describe fully in 
this paper, but they derive from the 1984 AT&T divestiture. After divestiture, the regional 
Bell companies were allowed to provide only local access and exchange services and long- 
distance services within their “local access and transport areas” (LATAs). Larger, more pop- 
ulous states have two or more such LATAs; hence, the Bell companies cannot provide intra- 
state long-distance services between these areas. The 1996 act allows the Bell companies into 
the interLATA market after they have complied with a “competitive checklist” for facilitating 
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into in-region interLATA services, which, in turn, is likely to be delayed 
by the FCC for several years.20 
Equally important, the continuing regulation of incumbent local carri- 
ers makes it difficult for them to respond to market conditions by changing 
their rates or service options. These carriers are still subject to lengthy 
state regulatory processes to adjust these rates or service conditions. As a 
result, low residential rates are likely to remain for some time, particularly 
in suburban and rural areas, reducing the incentive for new carriers to 
enter these markets except on a selective basis to attract heavy users of 
long-distance, vertical, or Internet services. 
14.8  Conclusion 
To  some observers, the fact that the United States has had the longest 
experience with telecommunications liberalization suggests that it might 
be  a  model  for  other  countries  to follow,  particularly  in  the  growth- 
oriented Pacific basin. However,  observers should ask why  liberalization 
is still not complete in the United States thirty years after it began. The 
answer is quite clearly that U.S. politicians have been reluctant to shed the 
notion that telecommunications regulation should be retained in order to 
move rents among political constituent groups-most  notably between 
urban and rural subscribers. The committees of Congress that control tele- 
communications policy are dominated by representatives from rural areas, 
and even conservative Republicans from these areas are willing to com- 
bine with liberal Democrats to use telecommunications policy to redistrib- 
ute income. This redistributionist goal, achieved largely through internal 
cross-subsidies, will be difficult to achieve if full liberalization occurs. As 
a result, regulation remains an important and counterproductive force. 
Other countries may learn several lessons from the US. experience in 
attempting to liberalize telecommunications: 
1. Reduce rate distortions as much as possible before attempting to in- 
troduce competition. 
2.  Require only limited unbundling of “essential” facilities for a limited 
time. Otherwise, encourage entrants to build their own facilities. 
3.  Establish a certain date for deregulating rates after entry barriers are 
lowered and entrants begin to offer services. 
20. In the nineteen months since the act was passed, only two Bell companies were able 
to persuade their state commissions that they have met the competitive checklist required 
for entry into in-region interLATA long-distance services, and both have been denied entry 
by the FCC. It may be several years before any Bell company is able successfully to run the 
gauntlet of state, Department of Justice, and FCC clearances for in-region long-distance 
entry. In the interim, many may simply decide that the prize is not worth the cost of ceding 
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4.  Limit regulation to the requirement of  reciprocal interconnection 
after retail rate and service deregulation occurs. 
The United States has been  trying to liberalize telecommunications for 
thirty years. This fact, by itself, provides ample testimony against the U.S. 
“model.” Indeed, in countries where national telecommunications carriers 
are notoriously inefficient, the U.S.  model of a long adjustment period and 
continued regulation can be justified as providing the “safeguards” against 
the rapid loss of jobs that is required for carriers to become efficient. The 
United States never had  a government-owned telecommunications mo- 
nopoly; therefore, it has fewer excuses for continuing telecommunications 
regulation this long. Estimates of the static economic losses from regula- 
tory rate distortions in the U.S. industry range from about $10 billion to 
$30 billion per year. With wireless costs falling so rapidly, it seems unlikely 
that any temporary or even permanent exertion of monopoly power that 
might be unleashed by  total deregulation could reduce economic welfare 
by  as much. 
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Comment  Shin-Horng Chen 
When talking about liberalization, one may expect free competition with 
few regulations. This is not the case in telecommunications. Market open- 
ing in telecommunications around the world is often followed by  regula- 
tion or, to be more precise, re-regulation. In his paper, Robert Crandall 
tries to show us that according to the U.S.  experience, regulations can 
undermine market opening. He begins by listing four requisites of success- 
ful liberalization, namely, no rate distortion, elimination of facility bottle- 
necks, market incentives only for promoting entry, and a commitment to 
phase out regulation very soon after entry occurs. For the benefit of read- 
ers, Crandall may need to elaborate on those requisites. 
However, in the United States and many other countries, rate distortion 
does occur because of cross-subsidies and, more important, because of 
universal service requirements. Like it or not, universal service has been 
considered essential to telecommunications. Thus arises the question of 
how regulators should deal with the universal service requirement if they 
are to eliminate rate distortion. 
Crandall also suggests regulators get rid of facility bottlenecks mainly 
in terms of interconnection. In this regard, equal access may be required. 
However, he has observed that the FCC went too far in mandating “equal 
access,” requiring local carriers to offer connection services to AT&T and 
its long-distance call rivals at the “same” rate. This gave AT&T’s rivals 
an advantage because local carriers’ costs of connection to AT&T were 
generally cheaper than those to AT&T’s rivals. On the surface, setting in- 
terconnection fees at the same rate for AT&T and its rivals may be fair, 
but it ignores the marginal cost pricing principle. Having said that, the 
above observation may also mean that AT&T has enjoyed advantages over 
its rivals in terms of getting access to interconnection, which seems to be 
the legacy of  AT&T  as the incumbent in the United States. How long 
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should the regulator and new entrants live with such an incumbency ad- 
vantage without taking any action? 
Crandall also suggests that apart from the interconnection requirement, 
regulators can encourage facility-based entry to promote network compe- 
tition. This may be desirable and feasible for a large country such as the 
United States, but for a small country such as Taiwan, facility-based entry 
and network competition may be limited to some extent by  its territory 
and market size. As a matter of fact, we have seen operators around the 
world forge strategic alliances and mergers to provide interconnected ser- 
vices. This may mean that network competition need not take the form of 
facility integration. 
The 1996 U.S. Telecommunications Act requires regulators to regulate 
the rates for wholesale services provided by local call carriers on the basis 
of forward-looking estimates of long-term incremental costs. This rule to- 
gether with the policy requiring the unbundling of all local network ele- 
ments, according to Crandall, has prohibited entry into local call services 
through the construction of new facilities. However, if historical embed- 
ded costs are used to determine the rates for wholesale services, different 
problems may arise. For example, we in Taiwan asked Chunghwa Telecom 
(CHT), the incumbent, to rebalance its tariffs. CHT has done so by basing 
its new  tariffs on historical  costs. However, one may argue that CHT’s 
historical costs probably include the costs of X-inefficiency, which are the 
legacy of CHT as the state monopoly. As a result, CHT’s new tariff struc- 
ture may not reflect productive efficiency. Therefore, using the historical 
cost approach to determine tariff rates may not be appropriate. 
In principle, we  all agree that  liberalization  means allowing market 
forces to prevail, but I am not entirely convinced by Crandall’s call for a 
governmental commitment to phase out regulation very soon after entry 
occurs-while  how soon is open to interpretation. It is feasible and desir- 
able to introduce competition into the telecommunications industry. Hav- 
ing said that, the industry has retained  the features of scale and scope 
economies in certain segments of the market. Also, there are incumbency 
advantages against new entrants. Certain regulations or regulatory over- 
sight may therefore be needed for some time to foster an environment of 
fair competition. 
Comment  Tsuruhiko Nambu 
In 1996, the US. Telecommunications Law was revised from its 1934 form. 
What was most impressive to me at that time was the spirit of the newly 
Tsuruhiko Nambu is professor of economics at Gakushuin University. Telecommunications Liberalization: The U.S. Model  435 
revised law, captured in the following: “The objective of this law is not to 
protect competitors but to protect or enhance competition.” Last summer, 
however, we got the orders of the FCC, and I was totally surprised to see 
that the spirit of the law had more or less faded. Robert Crandall’s paper 
is an excellent exposition of the basic problems of the US. situation. I will 
summarize the relevant issues. 
1.  FCC regulation may have the effect of inhibiting facility-based entry 
into the local market. 
2.  This follows from the orders of the FCC saying that interconnection 
should be done at the forward-looking cost. Forward-looking cost means 
the best technology available in the foreseeable future. 
3.  If regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) always interconnect 
newcomers on the basis of forward-looking cost, newcomers will lose the 
incentive to invest in the local loop simply because investment is meaning- 
less when they are guaranteed the best technology at the cheapest cost by 
the incumbents. 
It is my understanding that the present situation was brought about by 
the  deep-rooted  conflict  between  RBOCs  and  long-distance  carriers, 
which is traceable to the accidental decision of the AT&T breakup. The 
difficulties now stem from confused decisions at that time. The LATA con- 
cept is an example. Artificial lines were drawn between local areas partly 
based on the advice of AT&T. It became a big burden on telecommunica- 
tions players. But the situation is more or less the same in Japan, where 
the dispute over the desirability of  breaking up Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph (NTT) continued until 1997. 
Summing up, the U.S.  model has traits that are highly colored by  the 
historical accidents of the AT&T antitrust case. My feeling is that the US. 
experience cannot be a useful model for developing countries because in 
such countries government or public monopoly is a major player and anti- 
trust forces are not at work. 
The Japanese model might be more applicable to these countries be- 
cause, in Japan, a public monopoly (NTT) was privatized and competition 
was introduced. But I must also stress that government is a dangerous 
thing. Yesterday, government was like a chicken, but in my view, govern- 
ment is now like a cat in telecommunications regulation. 
Finally, I will touch on the divestiture problem. The main points are 
stated in Nambu (1997). In my view, the divestiture plan was doubtful in 
that it may help create more competitive structure in the future. On top 
of  that,  the AT&T breakup  teaches  us a  lesson. After  divestiture  the 
RBOCs and AT&T became true opponents and mutual mistrust  devel- 
oped. Now the RBOCs and long-distance carriers are discussing intercon- 
nection rules. 
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Hatfield I, 11, 111; the benchmark cost model I, 11, 111; the Strategic Plan- 
ning Policy Alliance model; and so forth. Some of them are sponsored by 
the RBOCs, others by long-distance carriers. The results of calculations 
of  reasonable charges are totally diverse. Of course, there cannot be an 
absolutely accurate figure for interconnection charges. The fatal problem 
is the insurmountable mistrust between the RBOCs and long-distance car- 
riers. Divestiture may well create this kind of difficulty as a by-product. 
I stress the peculiarity of telecommunications networks, where the plat- 
form of interconnection plays a decisive role for developing the industry. 
If people put too much weight on competition policy where divestiture is 
the choice for promoting competition, they may lose sight of the economic 
losses caused by the selfish and myopic behavior of telecommunications 
carriers. 
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